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Abstract 
This thesis is the study of the effects of public opinion 
on the growth of labor unions as expressed by two prominent 
newspapers, the New York Times and the Ohicago Tribune. The 
period studied, 1945-1948 .. preceeded a significant drop in the 
union growth rate. Excerpts in which editorial opinion was 
clearly expressed were chosen. The work is divided into three 
} 
broad categories of events; the post-war strike waves and the 
resultant anti-union legislation constitute the first two 
I 
categories. The third tactor studied was the effect of 
Communist infiltration on public opinion in trade unions. The 
previously mentioned areas of study, plus a more general survey 
of other social and economic fa~tors influencing union growth 
indicate that anti-union public selltiment gained strength until 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, whereupon public 
sentiment altered its course, becoming passive, if not 
sympathetic. 
This thesis constitutes a portion of a study of union 
growth undertaken by the Institute of Industrial Relations. 
OHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The human response to an existing mood in society is 
action through a formalized structure, i.e., an organization. 
Although goals and action usually identify an organization, 
the composition or size of the membership may also be identi-
fying characteristics. The shifting trends of memberships in 
human organizations are, therefore, avidly studied by those 
interested in the changing sooial and eoonomic scene. 
Membership rosters may ebb or swell at various times 
indicating the strength of the reaction from various seotors of 
the publio in response to the performance ot the organization 
in question. Reasons tor such changes are certainly ot interest 
to the leaders of a group, to stUdents of an organization, and 
in certain instanoes, to the general publio. In the case ot 
organized labor the former three categories are well defined. 
Labor leaders are oertainly very eager to learn what causes a 
rise of decline in the membership roles ot unions. The public 
in general oan be said to have a certain degree of interest in 
labor unions. however, that portion ot society employing 
laborers 1s greatly concerned about the activities ot union 
organizers and the resulting effects. Students of organized 
1 
labor have devoted much energy to answering the questions 
encountered in examining the growth of unions. Many theori.s 
have been preponded in an attempt to relate the growth to 
specific factors. 
2 
The purpose of this project is to explore the relationship 
between a single factor, public opinion, and the growth of 
organized labor. The effect ot public opinion on union growth 
was indicated by John Dunlopl and Joseph Shister.2 Specifi-
cally. the intent of this thesis is to examine the ettects of 
public opinion on union growth during the period 1945 to 1948. 
The selection ot a three year span is in conformity with the 
study presently being conducted by the Institute ot Industrial 
Relations on the determinants of union growth and the concomi-
tant variation in union membership. The year 1948 marks a 
substantial change in union growth, as compared to the years 
immediately preceed1ng and succ.eding the year 1948.' The 
events prior to this year are being studied to provide insight 
into the reasons why the downturn occurred. 
The historical data tor the period has been compiled trom 
the works ot noted labor economists and historians. The 
IJobn f. Dunlop, "The Development ot Labor Organizations," 
in I98!fht into Labor Issues, ed. Lester and Shister, 1948, 
p. 1 91. 
2Joseph Shister, "Th. LogiC ot Union Growth," Journal of 
Political Economl t Oct., 195', p. 41~14. 
'Handbook of Labor Statistics. Washington, D.C., Bureau 
ot Labor StatIstIcs, 1965. p. 345. 
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information on union membership for these years is based on a 
study performed by Irving Bernstein4 who t in turn, established 
his examination principally trom an unpublished analysis done 
by Leo Wolman. The union growth factors have been developed by 
Joseph Shister, Irving Bernstein, and John Dunlop. and further 
refined by Julius Rezler. 
The bulk of the research has been comprised through an 
analysis of the editorial attitudes of two influential dai11es. 
the N,w !ork Tim!s and the Qhioaso Tribune. The •• thod of this 
study is to examine and interpret the editorial attitude as 
expressed through editorials, signed articles. and letters to 
the editor.5 News articles were not used since they do Dot 
exhibit editorial opinion and should not do so. Editorials and 
signed articles on the other hand are recognized by their criti-
Cism, advice, and tone, instead ot unbiased news reporting. The 
New YOEk Tim!. provides an Index of material published in that 
newspaper which facilitated the location ot pertinent data. 
The articles reviewed were those contained under the headings of 
"labor" and "labor unions." The research ot editorial attitudes 
ot the Tribunl required a scrutiny Ot the dally publication for 
4Irving Bernstein, "The Growth ot American Unions." 
Am,ricAA Ec2DOrQc Rev!eth June. 1954-. p. :;04. 
5It is reoognized by the author that letters to the editor 
may appear at the whim of the editor. However, some letters 
direotly opposed to the opinions expressed in the paper seem to 
express qualitative if not quantitative reactions ot the 
readers. 
4 
the tour year period. All articles relating to organized labor 
or the labor movement in general were read. The use of sampling 
was eliminated by the scrutiny of all material related to the 
thesis topic as published by the two newspapers. Selection ot 
the exerpts appearing in the thesis was based prinCipally on the 
fact that they. aore than the others, expressed a definite point 
of view rather than reporting tactual information. .The news-
paper was chosen as an indicator ot public opinion because it 
has established its role as more than a purveyor ot social, 
political. and economic information. It is also a barometer 
which can inhibit or compel social action. For the purpose ot 
this thesis we must assume the premise. that editorials and 
letters to the editors reflect the public opinion as related to 
union growth and the issues involved therein. 
However, to elaborate on the basis ot selection, we might 
note that these two newspapers enjoy a large circulation in 
their respective geographic regions, which becomes increasingly 
important when one considers the huge union membership in 
New York and Ohicago. Newspapers of other regions were not 
chosen tor various reasons; however, let it suffice to say that 
union concentration in these two cities is substantial and that 
other geographic regions have commonly been beset by relatively 
local problems. Furthermore, it should be noted that the two 
newspapers utilized have already provided the basis for 
previous research done at the Institute of Industrial Relations 
5 
in the thesis "Editorial Attitude toward Unionism with regard to 
Important Labor Issues, the Years 1914-1921 Inclusive," by 
Eugene Monroe. 
The only other work of similar nature, to the writer's 
knowledge, is a thesis by Anthony Brzyski done at New York 
University for the Economies Department, entitled "Editorial 
Policy of the Itw York Time! to Labor, 19~O-l94?n 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
The increasingly important role played by organized labor 
in the twentieth century constantly generates interest for 
students of American labor, as indicated by one scholar of the 
labor movement: 
Of the organizations which stand in the foreground of 
our modern society, none i8 regarded and analyzed with 
more interest and anxiety than the labor union because 
of its fUnctions and the political and economic power 
it exercises • .1 
The concern of this paper is a short span of time in the 
history ot union growth, narrowed by only one faotor .. that ot 
the influence ot public opinion. Although the period of 
immediate concern of this paper is the four year span immediate-
ly following the war, a brief disoussion of the pre-war period 
might provide some interesting background information. With the 
coming of the New Deal came a. redress of the balance of power on 
the union and management seale in favor ot the unions. It was 
generally acknowledged by the public and its representatives in 
Washington that labor legislation relatively favorable to 
lJulius Resler, Union Growth Reconsidered (New York: The 
Kossuth Foundation. Inc •• 19SI), p. 1. ' 
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unions would serve to improve labor relations; therefore, a 
series ot measures were adopted between 1933 and 1938.2 In 
retrospect the major piece ot legislation of this era was the 
Wagner Act of 1935. Legislation plus a tremendous organiZing 
spurt during the latter halt of the 1930's, during which the 
automobile and steel industries were organized. gave organised 
labor a new position in society. 
It must be noted. however. that organizing such large 
portions ot the labor torce produced a certain amount of strite 
and industrial disputes. The public discontent that arose at 
this time was not immediately dealt with, however, because ot 
President:Roosevelt's convictions, 
In spite ot both labor disturbances and a growing 
demand tor modification of the Wagner Act, however, 
Roosevelt was to remain convinced that the increased 
strength of unions would in time lead to greater 
industrial stability.' 
The inception ot World War II created an atmosphere of 
nationalism in the United States which probably has not been 
equaled since. National defense needs required the pledge ot 
loyalty from both labor and management. This is not to say 
that either party gave up any intentions of protecting its 
interests during the period. However. the short supply ot 
labor 1n certain areas torced employers to deal with unions, 
2Foster Rhea Dulles Labor in America (New York: 
Y. Crowell Company t 19603 .-p;;;;;';;'. ~~iirlBb""'"'"."""'iiiiiiii.ij;""""""""""· Thomas 
'Dulles, p. 287. 
bringing unions and managements into closer relationships and 
resting a stabilized membership.4 
8 
The War Labor Board was created by President Roosevelt 1n 
January of 1942 to provide a meeting ground tor management and 
labor and to avoid untavorable legislation pending in Oongress. 
Initially, labor was pleased with the War Labor Board. largely 
because of its approval of union security. It created the 
maintenance of membership shop through which the union could 
keep diSCipline throughout the term of the contract. A provi-
sion was also made to protect the rights of individual members 
by allowing them a fifteen day escape hatch at which time they 
could withdraw trom the union. 
The assurance ot industrial peace initiated by the mainten-
ance of membership clause was offset within a few months by the 
-Little Steel Formula." Due to the demands of the employees of 
the so-called Little Steel Oompanies (Republic. National, 
Youngstown). the War Labor Board created a formula that was to 
become the guiding principle tor wage determination throughout 
the wartime period. According to this formula. wage adjustments 
were not to exceed a fifteen per cent rise in cost of living 
from January 1, 1941. to May 1. 1942. Although wages certainly 
remained stable while wartime price controls were in force, 
labor used its ingenuity. Fringe benefits were sought by 
4philip Taft. or~nized Labor in American Ristor: (New 
York: Harper & Row, hilshers, 19&4', p. 536. 
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organized labor and were severely restricted by the War Labor 
Board in order to avoid worker protests. Even though the War 
Labor Board was not popular in labor circles, it did accomplish 
its mammoth task with perspiouity: 
Between January 12, 1942, and August 18, 1945, the 
National War Labor Board closed 17,650 dispute cases 
involving approximately 12.2 m1l1ion workers. In 
over 95 per cent of these cases, the decision of the 
Board and its agents resolved the dis~ute without 
without~.rurth.r threat to production.? 
The labor picture was a relatively favorable one during 
the war; hov.ever.. strikes did occur, otten putting the war 
effort in peril according to the press; the coal strikes were 
considered to be especially reprehensible. 
The Smith-Connally Aot was passed over President Roose-
velt's veto in an effort to restrict strikes. It provided tor 
a thirty day notice tollowed by a strike vote. As a tinal 
measure, it also provided for plant seizure if the strike 
interfered with the war effort. Nevertheless, the effect of the 
bill was to bureaucratize striking instead of diminishing the 
incidence of strikes. 
Organized labor ellierged from the war as a solidified and 
respectable segment of society. Labor's cooperation and 
achievements were praised by military leaders as well as 
political leaders. Nevertheless, unions did not rest on their 
laurels. It was obvious that both managements and organized 
10 
labor had come out of the war determined to rectify the injus-
tices that each party felt it had suffered because of the wage 
and price stabilization. Both industry and organized labor 
were psychologically and financially prepared to battle it out. 
Jaster Rhea Dulles, the historian, stated that besides feeling 
deprived of their respective rights as a result ot war-time 
controls, both parties had grown rusty in the practice of 
colleotive bargaining.6 
By the end of 1945 the War Labor Board was dissolved in 
favor of the National Wage Stabilization Board.7 ~he function 
of this tripartite agenoy, composed of management, labor. and 
govera-ent leaders, was the indirect control at wages and 
prices. Nevertheless. the war had officially ended some months 
before and organized labor felt it was time to demand its due. 
fhe strike wave broke with a resounding crash. Four of the 
largest sectors of organized labor almost simultaneously made 
demands. all of whioh resulted in work stoppages, beginning with 
the automobile workers dispute to the steel workers strike, the 
coal strike and the railroad strike. fhe result at these 
strikes, ocourring simultaneously. was a show of tremendous 
power in the hands of unions. The public was shocked, but. 
6Dulles. p. 357. 
?Many of the observations made in the following survey ot 
facts will be documented later in the paper as they appear in 
the form of direct quotations. 
with the economy in a state of turmoil and civilian post-war 
resources not yet assessed, organized labor had the obvious 
advantage. 
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Although all factions of society seemed to be clamoring 
tor the removal ot wage and price controls, the actual removal 
of oontrols on November 9, 1946, signaled a seoond round ot 
industrial disputes. The United Auto Workers again led the 
fight for higher wages by striking first. The railroad workers, 
ooal miners, and telephone workers soon following suit. Th. 
seoond round of labor disputes, following so closely on the 
heels of the first round, enraged the publio. The nation had 
not totally recovered from the disorder caused by wartime oon-
ditions and was not about to endure what were felt to be 
unneoessary hardships. Other issues suoh as Portal-to-Portal 
pay demands added tat to the fire. because it seemed that labor 
was not satisfied to bargain collectively. Many court cases 
were ooming to light in which workers olaimed pay for time 
spent preparing tor the job on the premises. The publio 
demanded a law to curb labor's powerful demands. The House of 
Representatives prepared a punitive bill whioh would have taken 
indu$trial relations baok to the beginning of the twentieth 
oentury. The Senate produced a bill curbing union power. but it 
did not contain punitive measures ad did the former bill. The 
Labor-Management Relations Act. which was a composite ot the 
Senate and House bills, was passed into law on June 2'. 1947. 
12 
Labor leaders called it a slave-labor bill and vowed to fight 
it. The public seemed to have tasted revenge sufficiently and 
decided to reduce pressure on its representatives in Washington 
atter the Act went into effect a few months later. Some of the 
Clauses of the Taft-Hartley Act were readily apparent to be 
doomed to failure. The trend ot thought seemed to have been 
that labor had gone too far in its demands. but that the Tatt-
Hartley Act would n.ot be a satisfactory solution either. Some 
o! the provisions were recognized as "unworkable;" others were 
considered repugnant and insulting to unions, the case in point 
being the communist aff1davit. Since other organizations 1n 
American society were not required to sign such affidavits, 
unions shouted cries of discrimination. The charge of 
"Communist" was often rightly applied to certain labor union 
during this period; however, the accusation was often unjustly 
applied to other unions. 
The year 1948 was anti-climactic in comparison to the 
previous year; after labor's initial shock. the Taft-Hartley Act 
was found to be tolerable in practice if not in theory. The 
Democratic Party, however, regretted its hasty censure of 
organized labor and promised to rectify the inequity of the 
situation if unions would support the Democratic Party in the 
next election. The unions found the use of political pressure 
to be advantageous. Organized labor took advantage of its 
newly discovered position as a political pressure group instead 
l} 
of using the initially contemplated more violent measures such 
as strikes. The threatened third wave of strikes never 
materialized. 
CHAPTER III 
WAGE DEMANDS .AND STRIKES 
The first wave 
The post-war period brought more problems than anticipated. 
The predicted unemployment problem occurred immediately alter 
V-J Day. Certain segments of the public, apparently calloused 
by the war, did not view the unemployment situation as partiou-
larly troublesome to the economy as a whole with little thought 
of vital needs of the men returning from the war. The TriPMne 
editorialized along the following lines: 
With plenty of manpOwer. plenty of raw materials, and 
greatly expanded production capacity. we don't need 
to fear inflation. 
The New York Times, on the other hand, expressed concern 
over the unemployment 8i tuation.: 
Much is being said as to what the government ought to 
give to labor during the forthcoming period ot recon-
version unemployment. Little is being said as to how 
to speed the reconversion period and enable industr,y 
to reabsorb those who have been or w11l be rebased 
from war work and those wbo p~esently will be taking 
otf their military uniforms. 2 
lehicaso Tribun~t September 9. 1945. p. 12. 
2~ew York Times, September 3, 1945, p. 22. 
14 
15 
:r'he severity of unemployment became more evident ss indi-
cated by the statistics on unemployment gathered by the Census 
Bureau and reported by the N!w York Times: 
It is estimated that in the week of August 5-11 there 
were 830,000 unemployed and that for the week Of; 
September 2-8 there was an increase of 900.000. 
The publio seemed for the most part to be in sympathy with 
the working man's problems at this time; this letter to the 
Tim!1 exhibits such concern: 
In a recent editorial you opposed unemployment compen-
sation for Federal workers. I wonder if you have any 
conception of the suffering in the ranks--of those who, 
having worked long hours for four years with inadequate 
pay. now find themselves suddenly without jobs.4 
The editorial answer to the letter indicated a misunderstanding 
on the part or the reader; however, it does show public concern 
on the problem of economic hardship and unemployment. The 
unemployment problem WaS for the most part temporary, however. 
due to disorder in the labor market rather than to a shortage 
of jobs. As this issue solved itself. the true ooncern of 
unions became obvious. ~hel felt it was high time to reap some 
of the rewards gained by their employers due to high war-time 
production. The public was not in sympathy with organised 
labor on the issue ot wage increases. although, it could 
certainly be said to haye been on the side of organized labor 
'New YgriT1!es, September 25, 1945, p. 15, 
4Bew Ygrk Tim,s. October 12, 1945. p. 22. 
16 
in its efforts to avoid unemployment. The differenoe in the 
public attitude toward unemployment and the wage issue is 
readily apparent when one considers the effect of both issues on 
the public. In the unemployment issue the public could afford 
to be noble and demand employment for everyone. However, they 
were not so eager to concur with the workers' desire for higher 
wages it this led to strikes and perh~ps higher prices. As long 
as benefits given to workers were not at the expense of the 
pub1ic t s pooketbook, they certainly could afford to be 
righteous. The Trl,bune expressed what seemed to be the general 
tenor ot publio thought on this issue: 
What was needed was the prompt expansion ot the pro-
duction ot goods, moderation in wage demands, and 
eco.nomy in government." ••• The idea that there can be 
increased5wages without increases in prices is nonsense. 
The ilia'. ,xpressed i'ts opposl tion to raising wages in an 
editorial: 
But while the basic wage rates during the war increased 
from January. 1941. by only 20 per cent, average hourly 
earnings increased 53 per cent and average weekly 
earnings. 7? per cent. It is this last increase that 
unions are trying to freeze, though in the same period 
the Government figures show an increase in the cost-of-
living index of only 28 per cent.6 
Although the government received a great deal of criticism 
on its handling ot the post-war economy. it had little other 
50hlcaso Tribun!. December 4. 1945. p. 12. 
6New York T~mes. September 17, 1945. p. 18. 
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recourse. The government was first of all unprepared to 
replace wartime wage and price controls with mOdified peacetime 
controls and unwilling to abandon controls completely. Labor 
unions, on the other hand, were not willing to wait for the 
government to act. 
The President attempted to conciliate unions and manage-
ments by appointing neutral fact-finding boards to settle wage 
disputes. The decisions of the boards were in most cases 
unsatisfactory to both parties. The major management ob~ection 
was to discussions by either the government or unions ot its 
ability to pay. which it felt to be an infringement on its 
right to manage and its privacy. Unions felt the ability to 
pay should be a matter of disoussion beoause of greatly 
increased industrial profits. The noted labor eoonomist, Joel 
Seidman, backed labor's position with this observation: • Under 
the influenoe of rising prices, high levels of production and 
salest and diminished taxes. corporate profits were soaring to 
the highest point in the history of the country."? General 
Seoretary-Treasurer Julius Emspak (of the United Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers of America) concurred with this out-
look in a letter to the Time, remarking on the negative outcome 
of growing profits. "Despite glowing profit reports, the cost 
?Joel Seidman, American Labor trom Defense toieconversion (Chicago: University or Chicago Press, 195~), p. 241. 
18 
of living continues to mount in an inflationary crescendo. oS 
Nevertheless. both unions and the public demanded an economy 
tree of government controls. Professor Charles J. Walsh ot 
Fordham University wrote to the Time! advocating a hastened 
return to a normal state of affairs. He noted that an economy 
which is half tree and half controlled is necscient.9 The 
controls were finally removed because of pressure from all 
parties concerned and because the government felt that wide-
spread unemployment would counteract excessive wage increases.10 
Price increases wbicb occurred after tbe lifting of con-
trols had tbe effect of wiping out earlier real wage gains made 
by unions. ManJ appraisals of the cost of living and wage-
price issues were being made by all parties concerned. the 
government, unions. and management. The Nathan survey gained 
more notoriety than any other. According to Joel Seidman: 
The 010 relied heavily on an economic analysis made 
tor it by Robert R. Nathan and his aSSOCiates, who 
argued that a substantial wage increase without a 
general price increase was possible. justifiable. 
and essential from the point ot view ot t~e economy 
as a whole as well as that ot the ind1*idual worker. 
Nathan asserted tbat as 23 per cent increase was 
required to bring l'e~weeklY earningstJaek to the 
January, 1945. level. 
8N!~ York Time!. October 11, 1946. p. 22. 
9Niw Yo,k T~!St October 20, 1946, p. 12, IV. 
lOTatt. p. 564. 
19 
Another academician, Professor John Black of Harvard University, 
found the Nathan report to be detrimental to the economyt it 
followed. He predicted a spiral ot wage increases resulting in 
an economic crash.l2 
When all wage and price controls were removed, unions saw 
their chance to make up for what they felt they had lost during 
the war. Similar thinking on the part ot management, however, 
resulted in irreconcilable goals and a strong emotional involve-
ment ot each party attempting to rectity the situation. 
Professor Seidman summarily described the situation in these 
words. 
While protits were higb bet ore mass unemployment under-
cut labor's bargaining power--now was the time, unions 
believed, to torce wage rates up to compensate for the 
loss of overtime earnings. Where tactionalism or rival 
unionism existed, success would go toctbe group that 
produoed wage increases while the opportunity existed. 
Moreover] what about the employers who had yielded to 
the War Labor Board under pressure who had not yet 
reconciled themselves to unionism and COllective bar-
gaining? They would not abide by War Labor Board 
decisions now that the hostilities were over, and pub-
lic opinion would hardly support the President in plant 
seizures. the only weapon ot entorcement. A labor 
leader who talked ot a no-strike pledge under S~gh cir-
cumstances was inviting repudiation and defeat. , 
The early months of 1946 were appraised by the ~ew York 
Times in this statement: "strike has tollowed strike during the 
past tew months ••• •14 Supporting this point of view, Ph1lip~t 
12New YO£k Times, December 17. 1946. p. ~O. 
l3Seidmant p. 217. 
l4New York Times. May 4. 1946. p. 10. 
had the following observation to make: 
This was the beginning ot a twelve-month series ot 
labor-management conflicts unmatched tor their 'scope 
and intensity' in any comparable period in American 
history_ In the period between August 15, 1945, and 
August 14, 1946, 4,6~O work stoppages took place. 
They involved 4.9 million workers who lost 119.8 
million man-days otlwork, or 1.62 per ce~t of all work 
time in the period. ::> ' • .. 
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There were actually two obviou$ waves of strikes. The 
first round occurred in the winter of 1945-46, and the second 
occurred the following winter, 1946-47. Both waves of strikes 
were led by large and influential unions. An article by 
Louis Stark observed that the "squeaking axle gets the greas.~16 
The author cited the railroad. coal. and auto workers· unions 
as the most clamorous. militant, and greedy. The benefits pro-
duced by the strikes were far reaching momentarily because they 
set standards for smaller industries and unions to follow. 
However, their effect on the public and government caused a 
whiplash efrect. The public used its only sure weapon against 
the united front of labor unions; it retaliated by supporting 
anti-labor legislation. The strikes which produced this ettect 
received much public attention. The editorial comments were 
constant and unanimous in asserting that unions were demanding I 
unjust wage increases. Joseph Rayback concisely characterized 
the attitude of the people during this turbulent post-war 
15!ratt, p. 56? • 
16~ew York ~im.~t April 7, 1946, p. 9, IV 
period in these few words: 
The postwar anti-labor movement had its foundation in 
the widespread and large-scale strikes ot 1945-46 and 
the wage drives of 1946-47 which irritated a public--
far too busy converting itself to peacetime living to 
bother with the relevancy of issues raised. by union.-
which assumed, as the press oonstantly reiterated, Ithat 
most of its economic problems were caused by labor. 7 . 
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The first round ot strikes began later in the tall of 1945. 
In the beginning ot 1946, the industrial relations picture 
became dismal. The Tribune assessed the situation in terms ot 
the number on strike in the following ed1torial, 
At last report 400,000 industrial workers were on 
strike in this country. Strikes intended to paralyze 
the steel industry with its ?OO,OOO employees, the 
manufacture of el.~trical equipment with 200,000 
employees are scheduled for the middle of the present 
month. A telephone strike, involving a quarter of a 
million men and women, is also threatened and another 
in the farm machiner,y plants. The General MOisrs 
strike is already .well into its second month. 
When the United Auto Workers led the first round of 
strikes, the public was somewhat taken aback b1 the intensity 
with which the union was going about achieving ita goal; how-
ever. the reaction was comparatively minor in view of the 
distress caused by later disputes. The ~1.es expressed its 
opinion in the form of a recommendation to observe the Presi-
dent's wage policy. This question is an example of the initial 
reaction of the public to the strikes and wage demands: 
• 
17Joseph Rayback. A HistOiji of American Labor (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1959'. p. 3 • 
18Chicaso fribupe. Januar.y 8, 1946. p~ 8. 
Is it evidence ot a desire to destroy unions when 
management ofters wage increases within the limits of 
a national policy announced by the President. but 
refuses wage iucreases which will mean higher prices 
to eonsumers?l~ 
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The ~ribune was s~pathetic to at least one union during 
the beginning ot this action tilled year. It even praised the 
union leadership in a tongue in cheek manner: 
The Tribune has had frequent occasion to criticize 
shortsighted union leadership ••• It may be that this 
criticism is baving constructive results. Whatever 
considerations intervened in the settlement at the (stock) yards, we feel that the union_officials have 
acted wisely. We congratulate them. 20 
At the beginning ot that year several major strikes were 
pendinsmaking the public somewhat skeptical as to what it 
should expect of the unions in the United States. Such ambiva-
lence is still apparent in this early editorial on the steel 
strike: 
A strike of 700,000 is threatening tor January 14, if 
a OIO demand for $2. a day wage increase is denied. 
President Truman has called upon the union to show 
patience until a fact-finding board can determine 
whether an increase in the price of steel can be granted 
the producers ••• We do not believe that they, the union, 
will interfere with the greater achievement in produc-
tion, in efficiency, or technology, tor by doing so, 21 
they would injure those whose interests they represent. 
The editorial explained why it was opposed to fact-finding 
boards by pointing out that they are "projecting into steel and 
19New York Times, January 20, 1946, p. 8, IV. 
20New York Times, January 27, 1946, p. 8, IV. 
21Chic~o Tribune, January 6, 1946, p. 20. 
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automobile controversies a very definite spearhead of socialism; 
given time, they may go most of the way toward a virtual social-
ization of American industry.22 
The fact-finding committee appointed by the President to 
investigate the steel dispute recommended a 19.5 cents an hour 
wage increase, the same amount as recommended in the Auto 
Workers strike. U~ S. Steel rejected the proposed amount, and 
the union struck as planned. The strike affected 750,000 
workers and 85 per cent ot the indUstry. The final settlement 
was reached one month later with the union getting an 18.5 cent 
wage increase .23 
As the number of strikes grew in scale, making them hard to 
ignore, the public grew less ambivalent and wore negative in its 
reaction to the strikes. The strikes that directly affec.ted the 
public, of course, produced even more hostile reactions. ~e 
coal strike, for instance, aroused the public to voice its opin-
ion on both the strike and Mr. Lewis, the President Gt the coal 
miners' union. One editorial in the TribUDt stated that, "this 
ought to be the last nation-wide coal strike and it will be if 
Congress does its dutYt p24 implying that the government should 
take some action to restrain Lewis. An especially sardonic 
220hicago Tribune, January 6, 1946. p. 20. 
23Taft • p. 572. 
24Ch1cago Tr1bune, May 8. 1946. p. 18. 
letter aimed at Lewis had this to say: 
Now that • Eyebrows , Lewis has grudgingly permitted us 
to enjoy the contort of heated homes until next March. 
I think it about time that industry and private home 
owners see the light and switch from coal to oil or 
gas as soon as possible to do so. As the demand for 
coal diminishes, so will the power and ego ot Lewis.25 
Most letters about Mr. Lewis fell into this oategory; bowever. 
one letter was published by the ~ibun! glowing in praise for 
Mr. Lewis: 
Lewis has always proved himselt the most able leader 
this country has ever seen. That·s why he is hated 
by the New Deal. That's wby the admin1stra~6on in 
Washington is trying to hold the strike on. 
The Itw YOlk fia,s showed more concern over the nation-wide 
atter effects of the coal strike in the following editorial: 
It the 18~ cent an hour pattern is increased in an 
effort to buy otf the coal strike, other labor unions 
will insist upon obtaining additional raise~7and these. 
too, have to be reflected in higher prices. 
As much criticism was directed at Mr. Lewis as at the 
actual strike. The Tribunt found much to criticize in 
Mr. Lewis' attitude. In an editorial headlined "Strike or 
Insurrection?". the Tribune found Mr. Lewis' interpretation of 
the meaning of collective bargaining totally Objectionable.28 
250hic!sO !rlbune, December 11. 1946, p. 22. 
26qh~C!S2 TriiYn!, May 8, 1946, p. 18. 
27qhiC!60 Tribun". May 22. 1946. p. 20. 
28Chicaso Tribune, May 8, 1946. p. 18. 
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In another editorial the Tribune seems to have been thoroughly 
disgusted with Lewis' tactics. It warned in a threa'tening tone, 
"Mr. Lewis will be well advised not to challenge the nation in 
its present mood. He can't win such a contest. He can land 
beh1nd~bar8 ... 29 
Before an agreement eould be reached. Lewis became involved 
in a new dispute concerning vacation payments. The resulting 
series ot disagreements with the government caused Lewis to 
inform the miners that an impasse was reached; the governa.a' 
considered this, in effect, a strike call. Lewis was sub.e-
quently held in contempt ot court and fined $10,000 personally, 
with the union being fined '3.5 million. An appeal to the U. I. 
Supreme Court brought a diminished tine of 1700,000 tor the 
union, but the same tine tor Lewis. He was torced to call ott 
the strike and pay the tine upon threat of being forced to pay 
the initial fin •• 30 
The railroad strike, which occurred at the same time aa the 
coal strike, was also severely #.njurlous to organized labor's 
public lmage. TheTE1gune round this occasion to be appropriate 
for chastising both unions. 
!9Chlcaso Tribune, November 18, 1946, p. 18. 
30Tatt , p. 575. 
The government has taken over the operation of the coal 
mines and the railroads in an ettort to prevent the 
paralysis of the economic lite. 
These unions are monopolies. All of the members of 
each of the monopolies are capable ot acting, and do 
aot, in unison to achieve their Ob. jectives by bringing 
suffering to all of the people. 3l 
The Tr1bun~ found concurrence among its readers; this letter was 
published at a later dates uWh7 not apply some of the methods 
used in restricting the great capitalistic combines of the past 
to controlling the great, and almost; unrestrained labor mono-
polies of the present?"32 ~he New York Time! placed the blame 
on lenient legislation, reinforcing the growing dissatisfaction 
with the Wagner Act. The following editorial excerpt observed, 
uno essential industry is tree today trom the threat of being 
completely shut down unless it complies with a series of 
demands ... 33 
The extent of public disapproval ot the railroad strike can 
be discerned from the reaction of some merchants in Florida who 
refused to sell tood to railroad workers on strike.;4 A l.'ter 
from one ot the strikers, published by the Tribuu!. exposed the 
other side ot the coin: 
3l0hicago Tribune, Kay 23, 1946. p. 18. 
32Chlcaso Tribune, December 11, 1946, p. 22. 
33N!O! Jori Times, May 13. 1946, p. 20. 
34New York tAles, May 26, 1946, p. 24. 
Every railroad man knows that the retirement provisions 
as set forth in the railroad retirement act, are wholly 
inadequate ••• the railroad worker cannot retire until he 
reaches the age of 651 and th,en he will not because he just cantt see where ,120 a month will give him and his 
wife the living they art certainly entitled to after 45 
years of hard service.~' 
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Most major labor disputes were settled according to govern-
ment proposed wage increases. The publio, it seems, was will'ing 
to forgive and forget as long as industrial peace was to preval~ 
In retrospect we find that the short period ot calm in the 
summer of 1946 was really the eye ot the storm. The spirit of 
industrial peace was to last until the winter ot 1946, when 
Walter Reuther (whO was to be elected to the presidency of the 
United Automobile Worders Union during this strike) proudly 
announced that the UAW would lead the nation in a second round 
of strikes. This prospect thoroughly enraged the public. 
Reuther based his wage demands on the report of a tormer govern-
ment economist, which stated that, ·on the basis ot estimated 
earnings tor 1947, business can support a 25 per cent increase 
in wages. n36 When the government suggested that Reuther modify 
some ot his demands, he accused the government of siding with 
management. The lew Ygrk T1m!s did not agree with this conten-
tion and instead tound the fault lying with organized labor. 
35Chicaso Tribune" May 6, 1946, p. 14. 
}GNew York Times. December l~, 1946. p. 22. 
"This explanation overlooks entirely the pressure tor price 
increases created by the large wage increases demanded and 
obtained by the CIO unions themselves last spring."3? 
The second wave 
28 
Organized labor disregarded the menacing signs at public 
disapproval and plunged into preparations tor a second campaign 
at strikes, The ~ribun. warned the coal miners that a strike 
would bring calamity. 
It the coal union forces a further increase in wages 
in the negotiations soon to start, it will inevitably 
bring higher prices tor coal and otter further induce-
ments to coal &co.nomYl the use of substituting tuels, bankruptcy tor coal m nes, and unemployment for coal 
miners.;S 
In another editorial the Tribune pointed out the gravity 
ot a nation-wide strike, adding another warning: 
A strike in a single mine or group of mines can be 
troublesome and costly to the country, but cannot 
paralyze it. A simUltaneous strike in all the coal 
tields is insurrection and as such, must be forbidden 
under heavy penalty.'9 
Public opinion, as expressed in a letter to the Tribune, objects 
~o all strikes and strikers, showing the lack ot patience ot the 
public with the situation. 
3?New York Times, October 22, 1946, p. 24. 
>BOhicaso Tribune, January 19, 194?, p. 20. 
390h~ca60 Tribune, March 8, 1947, p. 10. 
.... 
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When a union, a group that hasn't a nickel invested in 
a business, sets up itself as the dictators as to who 
shall work or who shall not work in that businesst it 40 
is p~re usurpation and it becomes a group of racketeers. 
When the inopportune proposal was made to pay the mine 
workers for time lost during their last strike, the public was 
indignant, as this letter to the Tribune will demonstrate: 
The proposal of Robert L. Gordon, state director of 
labor, to pay 3~ million dollars to Il11nois coal miners 
for the time they spent in idleness during John L. Lewis' 
'no contract no work' 84rike a year ago is wrong legally 
and scandalous morally. 
The disregard by Lewis of the court ruling forbidding a 
strike caused much antagonism toward the mine workers specifi-
cally and unions in general. "Mr. Lewis has succeeded in 
getting most of his miners out of the mines despite a Supreme 
Court ruling forbidding him to do 80.,,42 Lewis was subsequently 
heavily fined for contempt ot court, again providing a great 
deal of negative publicity at an especially inopportune time. 
Few strike.s escaped the censure of the press during this 
periOd. The railroad workers· strike received this comment trom 
the press. 
The additional billion dollars sought by the railroad 
unions would not move an extra pound of trate (sic) any-
where in the country. It would be a tax on all frate (sic) 
users for the benefit of a relatively small group ot rail-
road workers, many ot whom would be paid tor not working.43 
4OChicago Tribune. April 23. 1947,p.1B. 
410hioaso Tribune, May 15, 1947, p. 24. 
42New York Times, April 9, 1947. p. 24. 
43Chicaso Tribun!. July 8, 1947. p. 12. 
However, the Tribune also published the miners' side of the 
story in a letter from one of the strikers explaining his moti-
vation tor striking. RRather than wage increases, most of us 
would rather see price control work. But as that is a failure, 
all we want now is a salary that will keep up with rising 
pricesl"" 
The UAW strike incurred the wrath ot the Tribun! to the 
extent that an editorial leveled the most serious insult that 
the Tribune had in store--communist aftiliat1on.45 Later in the 
year when the UAW struck Ford, the Tribune again published 
editorials with obvious contempt for the motives of the strikers 
and their leaders. 
The labor war lords are not now challenging the con-
stitutionality ot the act; they are asserting their 
defiance ot it and tor the people's representatives 
in Oongress who enacted_it. (The law referred to is 
~he Taft-Hartley Act.)46 
Public opinion as voiced by one individual's letter to the 
Tribunt offered some drastic; -solutions to the UAW activities: 
Michigan has been disgraced by city officials who say, 
'we are umpires, not strike breakers.' Umpires are 
needed in games, but they are not needed in oases of 
burglary or strike violence •. It would take but a 
small amount ot effective shooting to bring to an end 
the criminally conducted strikes ~hat htxe afflicted 
our state and nation tor so many years. 'l 
440h&Cai2 Tribune, April 25~ 194?,p. 12. 
45Ch!2a{:50 Tribune, February 16, 1947, p. 20. 
46Chlcaso Tr~bun!, August ?, 1947, p. 16. 
470h!CasO Tribune, October 1, 1947, p. 6. 
The New York Times had relatively favorable comments to 
make about the settlement of the steel strike in the midst ot 
activity concerning the passage ot the Taft-Hartley Bill. 
Undoubtedly there are some things to be said in favor 
of this agreement. For one thing, it obviously is not 
as serious a threat to inflation as the original 
demands would have been, had they been met. For another 
thing. it has been unaccompanied by two of the ~orst 
evils associated with the general round ot wage demands 
a year ago. One of these widespread stoppages was in 
the oountryts basic industries, the other was the i11-
starred intervention of Government through its so-oalled 
Fact-linding boards. «hich purported to say how much 
these industries could afford to pay in the way ot 
higher wages.48 
31 
The telephone workers strike caused a great deal ot comment 
in the Obi0ti0 Tribgne. One editorial censured the government 
for not stopping tbe strikE" 
Oongress. which used to jump over the stiok every time 
Mr. Roosevelt cried emergenoy. now bas a real emergency 
on its hands and is proceedlng with its routlne business. 
Since nothing can be expected of the executive, 60ngress 
should drop its oi;her b}i.ainess and enact a utility anti-
strike law immediately. 'j 
Another editorial expressed a great deal of vehemence and advo-
cated government intervention. "The nation's telephone communi-
cation system has been paralyzed by what is oalled a strike. It 
should be called a conspiracy against the Amerioan people. nSO 
Letters to the editor varied in tone. For instance, this letter 
48Chioaso Tribunl, April 23. 1947, p. 24. 
49Chioaso Tribun!, April l'l, 1947, p. 20. 
5OCh;oaso Tribune, April 8, 1947, p. 14. 
to the Tribune seemed to ask a sincere question: "How long is a 
long-suffering public supposed to wait for this outrageous strike 
against us to end?N5l The following letters cited here came 
from people directly involved in the strike. One employee ot 
the telephone company expressed what was probably a co~~on 
sentiment: 
Can you see the humiliation ot crawling back to work 
now? I have wished tor a long time that we oould all 
return to work honorably and respeotably, together.52 
Another letter is trom the wite ot a striker, clearly opposed to 
the strike: 
I think a lot ot them are using very poor judgement in , 
allowing themselves to be coerced into strikes by stew 
hotheads, or would-be 'big-shots.' I only hope that these 
ill-advised employees will not Spoil things tor the rest 
of us who have no kiok ooming. 5' 
Ironically, a union at the TribuPI struok on November 26, 
1947, and continued to strike throughout the tollowing year. 
The TribuD!. however. did not ohange its editorial policy toward 
labor as a result. The newspaper did not comment on the situa-
tion, except to apologize tor its poorly printed format. It 
did, however, print many letters trom its subscribers commending 
it tor continuing to operate in spite of the strike. 
The appeals ot unions 1n the torm ot wage demands and 
threatened strikes during 1946 found a public that was 
51Chica~o Tribun~, April 25, 1947, p. 12. 
52Chica~o Tribune, April 25, 1947, p. 12. 
5'Obica~o Tribune, April 27, 1947, p. 22. 
unreceptive to such impositions. People were not well disposed 
to the prospect of suffering further inconveniences imposed by 
unions. Public sentiment, as expressed by the following letters 
to the editor of the Tribune, was highly antagonistic toward 
labor. 
Let any man strike who will. Merely let other men, if 
they so desire, to apply tor and take the jobs of the 
strikers ••• Let the law of supply and demand freely oper-
ate in~work and you will see men paid what they are 
worth.~ 
Another reader had this opinion of his fellow working men: 
Why should thousands of people, who work the year 
aroun~pay their taxes, and receive small incomes, be 
kicked in the teeth twice--once thru (sic) taxes to 
maintain relief role for strikers and second, thry (sic) high prices because of the strikers' greed?" 
fhe right to strike was severely challenged by the public. A 
Tribune reader asked the following question: 
Wherein lies the right to strike when it is collusion 
or grouping together of many individuals in organized 
bodies to restrain trade, destroy private property, 
and interfere with that basic right of the ~reedom ot 
man to wo~k when and where he chooses and at his own 
contract?56 
The New York Times stated that, "nearly all strikes are 
strikes against the public." It further suggested a remedy: 
54Chicaso TribuD!, June 6, 1946, p. 18. 
55wew York Times, June 2, 1946, p. 20. 
56Chicago Tribune. May 21, 1946, p. 10. 
It 1s surely time that we removed the positive 
encouragement to strike in existing Federal legisla-
tion, (the Wagner Act) and in a lax local enforcement 
which permits strikers to prevent even former workers 
who wish to do 80, from peaceably continuing at their jobs.57 
In another editorial the Time; remarked on the~ne-sided" 
legislation benefitting labor, suggesting that restrictions be 
put on union activities. 58 Professor Sumner Slichter seemed to 
be a voice in the wilderness in his admonitions. He said: 
"any attempt to forbid strikes or to impose compulsory arbitra-
tion would ~nly make the ultimate situation incomparably worse 
than the present one.»59 Most editorial excerpts seem to 
follow the line of thought that unions have been exercising too 
many rights and exhibiting too much power. Much of the negative 
feeling seems to be directed against the Wagner Act, which was 
at this time felt to be too lenient. Suggestions to repeal this 
law or pass new limiting leb!alation were few at first, but 
gained much strength among the various antagonistic groups with 
the menace of prolonged strikes. 
After a fairly quiet fall, December brought the year, 1946, 
to a climactic ending. The Secretary of Labor, Mr. Schwellen-
bach, reported that "profits far more than increased wages are 
responsible for the present high cost ot living. w60 
57New York Times, May 10, 1946, p. 18. 
58w,w York Times, Pebruary 10, 1946. p. 22. 
59New York Times, January 16, 1946, p. 22. 
60New York Times, December 4, 1947, p. 4. 
This report aroused organized labor. 
010 demanded a third round of strikes. 
~5 
The vice-president of the 
The third series of 
industrial disputes never materialized, however. Actually, the 
first two waves of strikes and wage demands had sufficiently 
incited the public and its representatives to take legal 
measures against the organized labor movement. 
OBA..PTER IV 
LEGISLATIVE REACTION 
The Smith-Oonnally Act 
One of the first pieces of negative labor legislation 
which had an ominous fore bearing for organized labor occurred 
immediately prior to the period under examination. The Bmith-
Connally Act passed in 194' was a measure meant to restrict 
strikes during the period ot hostilities. 
The strikes that presented a problem during the wartime 
period plus the agitation of anti-union employers encouraged the 
passage of the Smith-Connally Bill. Dulles describes the 
measure in these words. 
The b111 provided. in the first instance, statutory 
authority for the War Labor Board. In the event that 
the board's intervention in a labor dispute proved 
unsuccessful. the President was then empowered to take 
overcontrol of any plant or industry where a halt in pro-
duction threatened the war effort. with criminal penal-
ties for any persons who thereafter instigated or 
promoted a strike.~ 
John L. Lewis, Jresident of the coal miners. immediately 
made use of that part ot the provision requiring that a strike 
lDulles, p. ,8. 
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be announced thirty days bafore it commences. This prompted the 
Times to make the following observation: h~his is the result ot 
one of the stupidest pieces of legislation, for the Smith-
Connally Act will doubtless point to his (Lewis') denunciation 
as an excuse for preserving this absurd provision. M2 In 
another espeOially caustic editorial, entitled: "Alice in the 
Ooal ~ields," the times circuitously praised the coal miners: 
At least Alice had the sense to rebel. "I can't stand 
this any longer, ... she cried atter her adventures 
through the looking glass. Hundred of thousands of 
Americans have been showing intelligence and courage 
on the field ot battle. Why hasn't there been enough 
intelligence and enough moral courage among our repre-
sentatives in Oongress tor them to speak oyt against 
this fantastic provision and to repeal it?' 
The Tribune called the Smi th-Oonnal1y Act- I. a law to promote 
strikes." The editorial did note, however, that this was the 
unforseen result ot a well-intended proposal. 4 
Even at this early date, the summer ot 1945, both the 
Tribune and the Times were hinting at amending the Wagner Act or 
introducing other legislation to compensate for what was felt to 
be undue leniency toward labor. The tone ot the editorial 
opinion can be felt in this excerpt trom the Timeit describing 
,. 
proposed legislation which is unfriendly toward labor: 
2New YO£k Tim!s, Octobe» 12, 1945. p. 22. 
3New York Times, March 30, 1945, p. 14. 
4-Chicaso Tribulle. December 2, 1945, p. 20. 
n ••• Senators Hatch, Ball, and Burton brought forth a proposed 
labor policy for the Government. which has been extemporizing in 
this field for many years. u5 
The post-war wage demands made by major unions and the 
clamorous strikes to gain their objectives lett the public 
embittered against the powerful unions. New wage claims served 
to portray the unions as greedy and too willing to take advan-
tage of their war torn employers. 
The Portal-to-Portal Act 
The Portal-to-Portal Act was passed at the height of a 
period when the cr.y tor anti-union legislation was being heard 
more often than not. The expressed purpose of the law was to 
protect employers from law suits claiming unreasonable amounts 
in back wages. In some cases the demands were unreasonable to 
the extent that the employer would have been wiped out finan-
cially had he paid the claims of the unions. The Mt. Olemen! 
Potter: case was the impetus tor the quick passage of an 
obviously necessary law defining working time and compensable 
time. The ease in point was the Anders2n, It. ale v. Nt, Olem-
ens Potterz Compagz.6 The United Pottery Workers of America 
charged the Company with violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
'New York Ti!e!. June 21. 1945, p. 18. 
6Anderson v, Mt, Clemens Potter: ComiaQZ. 328 U.S. 680 (194?). 
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Act regarding remuneration for time the employees considered 
part of their working time. The problem arose because most ot 
the employees were being paid on a piece rate basis. which 
meant that the time they spent actually getting to the place ot 
work after dressing on the premises was not compensable time. 
The decision of the court regarding the employees' claims 
was only resolved after a series of appeals. The original 
decision of the district court was in the employees' favor. 
However, this 4eci8ion was over-ruled by the Cirouit Court. 
which found the time delay incompensable. An appeal to the 
U. S. Supreme Court led to another reversal but stipulated that 
the amount of remuneration would depend on the findings of a 
survey under the auspices of the Cirouit Court. The final 
decision held that the time spent 1n getting to the job after 
dressing was not significant enough to be retroactively 
remunerated. This decision 1n lavor of the company was apprais-
ed by the T~mel in the following manner: 
Judge PiCard's decision in the Mount Clemens Pottery 
Company case had not killed off all pending portal-
to-portal suits, nor has it diminished the need for 
Federal legislation to keep such demands from reaching 
fantastic limits. But the effect bas been wholesome.? 
A Tribune editorial pointed out specifically what was commend-
able in its opinion about Judge Picard·s decision: 
••• lay down two generalizations which commended them-
selves for their intelligence and reasonableness. These 
7New York Times, February 14, 1947. p. 20. 
were (1) that any .eretorious suit should not be 
retroactive beyond June 10, 1946, when the Supreme 
Court handed down its intervretations of 'working 
time' as that time used in productive activities· 
and (2) that the doctrine of working time should not 
apply in the case of manufacturing as it does in such 
hazardous induetries such as mining, unless it is 
t substantial.'8 
This confusion over working time and compensable time led 
to the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act on May 14, 1947. The 
stated purpose of the law as stated by Oongress tollow.: 
An Act to relieve employers trom certain liabilities 
and punishments under the Fair Labor Standards Act ot 
1956, as amended, the Walsh-Healy Act, and the Bacon-
Davis Act, and tor other purposes. 9 
Public opinion was strongly against labor's position on 
Portal pay. One editorial in the New ~ork Time! pointed out 
that with every new labor suit, labor is hurting its own public 
image and endangering its already unstable position with 
Congress: 
Actually union labor lo.essomething with every new 
suit that 1s announced, in terms of the balance of 
strength between those members of Congress who tavor 
punitive labor legislation and those who counsel 
moderation. It would be difficult to conceive of 
anything better conceived to play into the hands of 
the reactlon&r7 element than this newest demonstra- 10 
tion of short-sightedoess on the part of union ,leaders. 
Another editorial in the New York Timel summed up the 
public distaste tor breaking the rules of fair play. 
aNeW York Times, April 4, 1947, p. 22. 
9tabor Law Course, (New York: Commerce Clearing House. 
1964)t p. "~13 •. 
lONew York Times, January 4, 1947, p. 14. 
But to introduce changes in the 'rules of the game' 
retroactively is an entirely different matter. Few 
persons will find it difficult to decide, as between 
the attitude of those unions which have started suits 
to obtain 'back pay- which they never contefplated 
receiving when they signed their contracts. ~ 
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~he issue of collective bargaining was brought up by the 
Times to remind organized labor af its own preferred method of 
solving labor-manege.ent relations problems. 
In the end we hope that organized labor will realize 
that wages ought to be ~djusted by collective bargain-
ing, not by fantastic proceedings at law, and that 
this famouf2issue will be remembered only as an historic 
curiosity. 
The ~ribune published a few letters from the public 
expressing, strongly negative opinions on the matter. One such 
letter sardonically suggested paying soldiers portal-to-portal 
pay.l' Another letter in the same vein had this to say: 
I suggest that union labor bosses demand pay from their 
employers tor time spent in their favorite barber shop, 
the time also to include portal-to-portal pay •••• Atter 
all, didn't their hair and whisker!4do a large part of 
their growing on company property? 
One letter suggested an accounting system; the author agreed to 
portal-to-portal pay tor both s1des, but only under h1s aooount-
ing system. T1me under th1s system would be aocounted for and 
paid accordingly. Por instanoe, time used for personal matters 
llN!W York Time Sit January 18 t 1947, p. 14. 
12New YO£k T1m'!.s, February 9. 1947, p. 8, IV. 
13Ch1caso Tr1bun~, January ,. 1947, p. 12. 
14Chic8fiO Tribune, February 8. 1947. p. 8. 
would be deducted from company time. 15 There was, of course,. 
another side to this story, as made apparent by this letter to 
the Tr1bunt: 
I remember, when I worked in a large steel plant, my 
fellow workers and I were docked 15 minutes for any 
time over three minutes that we punched in late. I 
guess itlgll depends on who is wearing the shoe that 
pinches. 
The Case Bill 
As the second wave of strikes was distressing the public 
and portal-to-portal claims were making labor unions look 
greedy. the 80th Congress was actively planning more retaliatory 
measures. This sample of editorial advice on legislation 
governing industrial affairs comes from the Tribune: 
The continuous interference with national life and the 
persecuting of everybody by a very few labor leaders 
in key positions bas become by tar the greatest domes-
tic problem ot today. Congress cannot move tO~-fast 
to tree the American people from this tyranny. ( 
A week later, the Tribune reported with increase~ re~vor: 
The public is getting heartily sick and tired of picket 
lines. Pickets should be rigorously restricted to the 
peaceful exercise of that function. Oongress is amend-
ing labor statutes that should strike out the one-sided 
provisions ot existing laws which prevent the discipline 
and regulation of picketing, to see that i* remains lawtu1;~8 
15 
Ohicago ~£ibune, February 6, 1947, p. 18. 
16Chicaso Tribune" February 18, 1947. p. 18. 
17Chicaso Tribune, May 2, 1947, p. 16. 
18Chicaso Tribune, May 20, 1947, p. 18. 
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The New York Times was more specific in outlining its objections 
to existing legislation. First, the Times said, " ••• we con-
cluded that the 'Wagner Act', in its present form. has tended to 
increase and prolong strikes ••• " This was followed by a nega-
tive appraisal of the National Labor Relations Board, which the 
Timel said, " ••• makes it an easy and riskless undertaking to 
star~ and prolong strikes, whatever the cause of the strike or 
the conduct of the strikers. ul9 
The Oase Bill, submitted to President Truman May 29, 1946. 
was devised expressly to limit strikes. Foster Rhea Dulles 
described it as follows: 
Among other features it set up a Federal Mediation 
Board, prescribed a sixty-day cooling off period before 
any strike could be called, decreed 108S:ot their rights 
under the Wagner Act tor any workers who in these cir-
cumstances lett their jobs, banned both secondary boy-
cotts and jurisdictional strikes, and authorized the 
use of injunctions to prevent violent or obstructionsl 
picketing. 20 . 
A Tribune editorial expressed the hope that the Oase Bill 
would be a test to determine the need tor stronger measures; 
The passage of the (Oase) Bill would serve, at least. 
as a warning to union leaders that they don't own the 
country. If that warning isntt enough, Oongress will 
have to go farther and flatly forbid strikes in public 
utili~ies and atew other essential industries, like 
coal. I 
19New York Times, February 15, 1947, p. 14. 
2ODulles, p. 372. 
21Chieago Tribune, May 4, 1946, p. 10. 
--
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Another editorial in the Tribune praised a portion ot the bill 
which the Tribune felt was a sorely needed remedy for an un-
equivocal situation. That section, according to this editorial, 
made, " ••• labor unions and employers equally liable under law 
for violations of their contracts. n22 The *imes. however, was 
not 80 favorably disposed to the Case ,8ill. It especially 
objected to the idea of government seizure beoause: "It tends 
to erode the idea of private property."23 The Case Bill was not 
passed because of the President's veto. Oongress, however, did 
not intend to allow the matter of curbing union power to end 
there. Although the President was opposed to severe legislative 
measures, he did concur with Congress on some points: 
President Harry Truman recognized the existing senti-
ment for change. and in his State of the Union message 
to Congress, on January 6, 19471 suggested action be taken to prohibit Jurisdictiona strikes and oertain 
kinds of secondary boycotts. He also asked for the 
creation ot more efficient machinery for the avoidanoe 
of strikes and lockouts. Finally. he recommended the 
appointment of a temporary joint commission to inquire 
into the entire field ot labor-management relations 
and r9Port back to Congress not later than March 15. 
1947.211-
Both the Bouse and the Senate moved quickly to formulize their 
objections to union aotivities and construct some sort of 
format tor revising the current labor laws. 
22ChicagO Tr1buD!. February 3. 1946, p. 20. 
23New York Times, May 23. 1946. p_ 20. 
24Taft , p. 579. 
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The Ta.ft-Hartley Act 
In April of 1947 the first drafts of a new labor law were 
being discussed in the press. An excerpt from one of the first 
Tribune editorials ~overing the proposed legislation follows: 
Both the House and Senate have labor reform bills in 
committee. Both bills have excellent features and 
both have features of debateable merit. Both will be 
taught bitterly by organized labor on all pOints, good 
and bad, but it caD be expected, and certainly it is 
to be hoped, that '.:;Congress will not bl swayed by the 
protests of these special interests. 2, 
Reactions to the first drafts were very soon being hotly dis-
cussed in the press. The New York Times had the following 
reaction to Philip t1urray' s charges against the proposed legis-
lation: 
••• there is nothing to justify the extravagant charge 
of Philip Murray, President of the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, that the pending proposals 
represent the first step toward Fascism in the United 
States ••• As debate begins, the clear need is for 
legislation which is not anti-labor but anti-labor 
monopoly. 26 
One vociferous spokesman for the labor faction, Willi.am Green, 
led a vigorous campaign against the Taft-Hartley in the New York 
press. The Ti.e~ reported the statements made by Mr. Green, but 
summed up the comments in praise of the bill. 
25ChiC8S0 Tribune, April 12, 1947, p. 12. 
26ft!W York Times, April 15, 1947. p. 24. 
In a nation-wide broadcast the other evening, William 
Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, 
repeatedly referred to the two labor bills which have 
been taken in charge by Senate-House conference commit27 
tees as the Taft-Hartley slave-labor legislation •••••• 
In the early stages of the 'l'a!t-Hartley Bill, the Times editor-
ials were strongl7 opposed to the objections made by organized 
labor, as indicated by the following excerpt: "The Hartley Bill 
was never as bad as Mr. Green would have us believe, but it is 
a much better measure for the changes that have been written 
into it in conference committee ••• Q28 Mr. Green, in turn, 
became increasingly a~rimonious in his replies, as in this 
letterr 
Apparently, that 1s the difference between you and me. 
Your expressed opinion and attitude toward the Hartley 
and Taft anti-labor bills apparently are based on your 
academic logio and conclusions, influenced perhaps by 
a biased attitude toward the labor unions. My opinion 
is based upon realism, facts and lessens learned in 
the hard school of experience.29 
The Time! recognized the resistance of organized labor to the 
proposed legislation and suggested the use ot accepted methods 
in laborts fight. The following is evidence of this: 
Labor is still determined to tight the measure and, if 
possible. force its repeal. Present prospects, however, 
are that the long battle will be wageG. only in the t.ra- 30 
dit10nal American way, through courts and the ballot box •. 
27New York Times, September 1, 1947, p. 18. 
28New York Time!. May 28. 1947, p. 24. 
29New York T1e!s, May 28, 1947, p. 24. 
30New York Tae!, June 29, 1947, p. 10, IV. 
Another editorial confirmed the tormer observation regarding 
planned political action. 
American labor has embarked upon a new political pro-
gram and that its program in etfectl it not in purpose, constitutes an attempt to torm a po itical bloc. The 
occasion is the o~po8ition of most labor leaders to the 
!raft-Hartley Act.~~ 
The Times made another observation when it perceived the dif-
terence 1n attitude between the 010 and AFL regarding a course 
ol action in opposing the Taft-Hartley Bill. The Times 
predicted this ditterence in attitudes would result in further 
dissension between the two groups. 
Organized labor's opposition to the Taft-Bartley Law 
appeared to be taking such different practical forms 
that the new legal repressions may intensity the 
struggle between the two ma~or union groups instead 
ot driving themx~loser together as many observers 
had prophesied."" 
President Truman hesitated between advising Oongress to pass the 
necessary measures and warning Coogress against punitive 
legislation. His tone in a message to Congress exhibited this 
feeling of restraint in advising limiting union power. 
But all )his is one thing. It is quite another thing 
and a very necessary thing. to overhaul existing led-
eral labor legialation--beginning with the Wagner Act--
in order to weaken the power of artificially created 
monopolies and create the conditions whiCh will foster 
more even-handed collective bargaining.~' 
31N9!w York !rimes, December 26, 1947, pl. 14. 
32New York !rim,s. June 28, 1947 t pl. 12. 
33N!W York lim!s. January 7. 1947, p. 26. 
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The Times did not view the forthcoming bill as punitive, but as 
necessary in this excerpt: 
There has been little or no suggestion of anything, 
that could be described as • punitive , legislation ••• 
in what that group seeks is not legislation which 
would outlaw strikes, but legislation which would 
make them unnecessary.~ 
One indication of public opinion was a letter published by the 
Times asking tor fair play. 
What we call 'labor' is made up of citizens of the 
United States. What is • punitive , about arranging 
our laws so that every citizen is subject to exactly 
:::r~::: ~.;;s ~~!,~e~!;t3~::?o~~::~t~::rt~!ay?35 
The following letter, strongly opposed to the proposed 
legislatioD. was somewhat unusual because of its authors---the 
letter was signed by twenty eminent protessors ot the top 
universities in the United States. This excerpt desoribes the 
area ot their concern: 
w. strongly oppose any legislation which attempts to 
wipe out the gains made in the last decade granting 
the workers a somewhat more equal bargaining position 
with industry, and which proposes how to plact workers 
economically at the mercy of their employers.,6 
The New York Tim,s seemed somewhat inconsistent in its 
attitude toward the Taft-Hartley. Bill. On one occasion it 
favored the Senate bill, but not the House bill. as expressed 
by the following quotation: 
"Bey York Times, February 19, 1947, p. 24. 
"5New York fimes, February 7. 1947, p. 22. 
36fte! York Timeg, March 12, 1947, p. 24. 
Mr. Hartley, o~ New Jersey, ventured the prediction 
that the tinal draft ot this important legislation 
will drop both the proposed prohibition ot industry-
wide bargaining and the proposed authorization tor 
private employers to seek injunctions against certain 
types of strikes ••• we hope that Mr. Hartley's torecast 
ia correct. 
We trust that the House conferees and behind them 
the House itselt, will have the statesmanship to waive 
provincial pride and take the Senate bill ~ith a tew 
minor improvements, and take it promptly.3~ 
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In another editorial, however, the Timel expressed opposition to 
the bills ot both Houses tor the following reasons: 
These bills be~ore Congress, however, both the drastic 
Hartley Bill and the less extreme Taft Bill, would, to 
an extent not generally reoQ,nized, increase Governmen~ 
intervention, encourage resort to the National Labor 
Relations Board or the court, and prevent prompt settle-
ment at home o~ many questions tor Which there is not 
real need for lederal intervention.'S 
The House of Representatives pas.sed their bill by a 
"decisive majority ot 308-102."39. The Senate passed a less 
severe bill which the New York Times found to be an impressive 
p , 
indication of majority approval. 
But the size of the majority it was able to command, 
68 to 24, conveys a message which is too plain to be 
misread. In our opinion it is an effort which, in 
its general approach to the problem. reflects the 
democratic process at its best.40 
Since the bills pasaed by the two Houses were significantly 
different, the President appointed a committee to combine the 
prOVisions into a single bill. 
37New York Tim,s, May 16, 1947, p. 22. 
,aNew York Times. May 6, 1947, p. 26. 
,gNeW York T~mes. May 7, 1947, p. 26. 
40New York Times, May 14, 1947, p. 24. 
~bile the two Hous~s ot government were busy reaching a 
compromise, the press was pessimistic. A Tim!s editorial 
observed that, • ••• much is heard of the possibility that these 
efforts will come to naught. That possibility stems trom the 
tact that no one 1s quite sure what kind of legislation the 
President will approve and what kind would invoke his veto_·41 
Speculations were common that the President intended to veto the 
bill for po~itical reasons. The Times has this observation to 
mue: 
Labor's prestige in legislation halls has fallen to a 
new low, yet its potential political influence has 
never been greater than today ••• lt the political solid-
arity ot organized labor is cemented in the coming 
months, some observers believe4that the political swing ot last year will be reversed. 2 
This prediction made at the height ot the anti-union public 
sentiment turned out to be a correct one. President Truman's 
political motives in vetoing the Taft-Hartley were not quite so 
tavorably viewed by the press. The New York Times had this to 
say: 
Most political observers agree that while Mr. Truman 
may not win in 1948 with the labor vote, he certainly 
cannot win without it.43 
The Times also made note of the tact that the President and 
many Senators were receiving a great deal ot mail in support ot 
41New York Times, May 7, 1947, p. 26. 
42New York Tim.es, May 4, 1947, p. 7, IV. 
I 
43New York Times, April 20, 1947, p. 7, IV. 
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the President's intention to veto the proposed legislation. The 
Times did not seem to have any faith in opinions expressed 
through the mails. 
Floods of telegrams are sa.id to have descended on many 
anti-veto Senators, urging them to switch to the support 
of the President. The effort was nil ••• The reason for 
this is, of course, familiar. Floods and inundations of 
telegrams may be released on Congressmen by somebody 
pressing a button.44 
Another editorial suggested ignoring the mail and examining the 
election record of the House of Representatives during the last 
election. 
Mr. Truman's mail, we are told, is running strongly in 
favor of a veto ot the new labor bill which now awaits 
his action ••• Is it not fair to assume that the members 
of a House of Representatives elected on peacetime 
issues only have at least as good an understanding of 
what their constituents expect of them---if there is 
unfortunately to be a difference of judgement here---
as has a President elected under the wartime conditions 
of 1944145 . 
The Bill, as submitted by the conference, was passed in the 
Sena.te by a vote ot 54 to 17, and in the House by a vote of 320 
to 79.46 The Time, had this to say on the results of the vote: 
nIt d~sarmed the more extreme and unreasoning of its critics 
(who, needless to say, are also the noisiest) of the weapon 
whioh up to this point has been their reliance. n47 
44New York Times, June , 26, 1947. p. 22. 
45New York Time! I June 11, 1947, p. 26. 
46 Taft, p. 583. 
4?New York Tim!!, June 5, 1947, p. 2~. 
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The President was, nevertheless, not satisfied with the 
bill and proceeded to veto it on June 20, 1947.48 In expressing 
his reasons tor vetoing the bill, the President called it 
"unworkable." The New York Times severely criticized the 
President tor "inviting sabotage" by damaging the chances ot the 
bill to prove itselt.49 A letter to the Tribune expressed this 
-
hostile opinion of the President's action: "The inconsistency 
of President Truman in his veto ot the Tart-Hartley Bill, 
showed his absolute unfitness as the leading executive of our 
country.".50 
The House wasted no time in overriding the Presidential 
veto. The Times seemed to express surprise and disappointment 
because the Senate did not tollow suit, in spite ot its previous 
objections to the bill as it stood. The Times' editorial 
comments on the Senate debate were: 
When the House of Representatives voted to override the 
Presidential veto ot the Taft-Hartley Labor Management 
Bill there s'emed to be no obstacle to similar action 
in the Senate ••• This was not government by debate but 
by an attempt to thwart theswill ot a majority of Oon-
gress by power of nuisance. ~ 
Another Times editorial seemed impressed with the voting record 
regarding the Taft-Hartley law, intimating that the measure must 
therefore have substantial value. 
~ewYOrk Times, Taft, p. 583. 49 . New York Times, June 24, 1947, p. 22. 
5OChicaso Tribune, June 26, 1947, p. 18. 
51New York T1me~t June 22, 1947, p. 8, IV. 
ActuallYl throughout the whole debate which sent this legislat on to the President, the Taft-Hartley Bill 
oommanded at all times majorities ot three of tour to 
one in both the Senate and the House--a record of 
vigorous bi-partisan support unmatched in the case of 
any other controversial measure 0!2similar importance 
enacted into law in recent years.' 
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~e Tribun~ had praise for the newly enacted bill and tor 
Senator Taft, who the Tribune felt to be largely responsible tor 
perfecting the measure. "The bill as it emerged trom confer-
enoe and as it was eventually enacted is not a tough measure nor 
is it a sott measur.. It iSj above all, a workable law ••• 53 
The Time.s enumerated some of the basic provisions of the law, 
optimistically stating that they, " ••• may change the entire 
course of industrial relations. H54 The T£ibHQe shared these 
sentiments in this statement: "The bill will give the nation 
the first tair and workable system ot labor relatlons ••• w55 
Although the Labor-Management Relations Aot was passed on 
June 23. 1947. it did not go into effect for 8 few months. 
Comparatively little was said about the new law by the ,press 
during the summer, perhaps in anticipation ot the real test ot 
operation in the fall. The opinions that were expressed during 
the summer were those of speculation or tapering expressions ot 
dissatisfaction with unions. 
52New York T1me~t June 24, 1947, p. 22. 
53Chicago Tribune, June 25. 1947, p. 16. 
54New York Times, June 24, 1947, p. 4. 
550hicaso Tribune, July 1, 1947. p. 16. 
One letter to the Tribune explained why labor was dissat-
isfied with the "meritorious" Taft-Hartley Bill: "The hue and 
cry in labor ranks over the Taft-Hartley Bill is quite under-
standable when one considers its interference with the many 
high-handed practices of unions.,,56 The ~imes. meanwhile, 
expressed the 'opinion that the law would benefit the individual 
workers if not the labor unions. 
I! unions. as such, have lost soma freedom, workers 
have gained some freedoms. The labor union has come 
under a regulation comparable with that long e~.rcised 
over the corporation--and for similar reasons./( 
Reactions, possibly violent ones, were expected from labor. 
However, the only group that responded with a strike to the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act was the United Mine Workers 
Union. The Tribune observed that: 
Within 24 hours atter the Senate overrode the Truman 
veto ot the Taft-Hartley Labor Law, John L. Lewis' 
soft coal miners began to drift out of the mines ••• 
This country is not going to allow 400,000 coal miners 
to blockade its bill.58 
The Times was in agreement with this contention adding that: 
"Elsewhere there have been no interruptions of work that could 
be described as 'protest strikes' against the law. n59 
560hicaso Tribune, June 26, 1947. p. 48. 
57New York Time,. August 24, 1947, p. 8, IV. 
>SChicngo fribune, June 26, 1947, p. 48. 
59N1W Yo,rk Ti!e~. August 10, 1947. p. 7. 
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When the law went into effect, the press again seemed 
impressed with tbe promising results the law had in store. This 
attitude is expressed by a typical editorial in the Tribune. 
The Taft-Hartley law bas been in effect for only a few 
weeks, but already it bas some substantial achievements 
to its credit •••• The underlying purpose ot Congress was 
to impose responsibilities on unions to match their 
privileges. It is still too early to say that Congress 
has wholly succeeded in reaching this goal~Abut the evi-
dences to date are definitely encouraging.ov 
But merits of the new law seemed to ebb as summer turned to 
fall. The press became less sure in its praises of the Tatt-
Hartley and the public less clamorous for punishment of 
striking workers and union leaders. One letter to the Timts 
found the Taft-Hartley inequitable in its treatment of workers 
during a strike. 
Employees who will be restrained by government inJunc-
tions from carrying on a strike will certainly bridle 
at the suggestion that there 1s equal protection under 
our laws when the Taft-Hartley law permits employers, 
as it does, to cut wages and reduce working conditions 
during the injunction period when workers are encased 
in.J.legal strai t-j acketa. 61 
The ~GW York Times. expressing a great deal of faith in the 
American sense of Justice. advised unions to be optimistic and 
to expect the correction of the short-comings of the new law. 
The labor union is an integral and necessary part of 
our induat:Dial society. Its freedom, and its obliga-
tions are those essential to democracy. If experience 
6OChicaso Tribune, September 4, 1947, p. 20. 
61New York Times, November 27,1947, p. 30. 
proves that the Taft-Hartley Act has violated any basic 
freedoms--and in one or two instances it may have don.e-
so--then that error will be corrected. Labor can trust 
the American public's sense of justice ••• Today, in spite 
of all past mistakes. present doubts, and incidental 
animosities. we can confidently wish the labor movement 
well.62 
In another editorial the Times found fault with certain Tatt-
Hartley provisions, adding that, a Congressional Committee to 
study the Taft-Hartley in operation was a positive step in 
appraisal of the new law. 
Some changes, undoubtedly. like the tnon-communist' 
atfidav.it and the uncritioal ban on political activity 
by unions. will eventually be rejected or mGdi1'ied, 
others may have to be de-emphasized or tightened up. 
But,. in any case, we have now for the first time a 
complete labor law. an administrative body to carry 
out its provisions. and something unique and refreshing 
in our legislative experience--a Oongressional Committee 
to watch the law in operation and be prepared to recgm-
mend changes it and when they seem to be oalled tor. , 
In the post-Tart-Hartley year 01' 1948, the letters and 
editoI'ials on unions were far less common than in the past two 
years. Some· 01' the oomments which did appear were concerned 
with specific provisions of the Taft-Hartley law. For instance, 
the Tiae. was 1n complete sympathy with organized labor on the 
issue of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. An editor-
ial indicated that the provision,:tt ••• proh1biting a union 
newspaper from commenting editorially on political candidates is 
62New Ygrk fil!S, August 22, 1947, p. 14. 
63New fork ~&m.s, September 1, 1947, p. 18. 
an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech ••• n64 
On the whole, the law was not seen as disfunctional or 
disrupti va of .. normal union acti vi ties by the press. The New 
-
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York Times reported the findings of a Oongressional Oommittee on 
the six month progress of labor-management relations since the 
passage of the Tart-Hartley in this way: 
It finds that strikes, in number, in man-days of idle-
ness and total number of workers affeoted. have steadily 
declined in each successive month since the law became 
fully operative last August 22 ••• But the six months 
record, on the wholel deserves the committee's appraisal 
that the law is work ng 'without undue hardships upon 
employer or employee'--even-handed collective bargaining.65 
A month later, ~he Tribupe had these observations to make 
regarding the;1aw in operation: 
It (Taft-Hartley) isn't in any sense a tough law. It 
hasn't interf~ed with a single legitimate activity 
of the unions. It hasn't forbidden them to organize 
or to strike. W. do not recommend union busting laws 
but nobody can p:revent their enactment if the present 
abuses continue.bb 
In June of 1948, after the Taft-Hartley had been in efrect ten 
months. the fbl!S stated that the law had not been in effect 
long enough to be due for major revisions, even though some 
sections were admittedly "unworkable." This editorial viewed 
favorably the following Congressional decision: 
64WtW Yori Times, March 16, 1948, p. 26. 
65~!w Yori T!!.s, March 17. 1948, p. 24. 
&GNew York Times, April ;, 1948, p. 12. 
The Joint Congressional Committee on Labor-Management 
Relations, which has been conducting hearings for the 
past week or mOre on the proposed amendments to the 
Taft-Hartley, had voted not to recommend any changes 
at the present sessions. That means, in all probabil-
ity, it will not be reopened before 1949.67 
Nearing the end ot the year, however, the Times published an 
article by Joseph Loftus und9r this headline: "One thing seems 
certain---tbe labor law will not remain as is."68 A week later, 
an editorial advocating another position was published; regard-
ing the proposed amending action, the Times objected to 8n7 
changes in the Taft-Hartley with this thought: "We might as 
well learn as soon as possible whether we still have re.presen-
tative government in this country or whether Oongress can be 
made to abdicate its functions. n69 This fluctuation indicated 
an obvious instability in editorial policy and possibly in 
public opinion as well. In other editorials the Times did not 
see the Taft-Hartley as equitable to management and labor. This 
exOerpt seems to explain that position: 
Equality of treatment.under our law$ has been a oher-
ished tradition and its basie toundation. The provi-
sions ot the Taft-Hartley Law making it mandatory to 
see injunctions when labor unions violate the law and 
at the same tim. making it only discretionary when 
employers violate the same law is an imbalance which 
should be A8rrected be!ore any more labor unions are 
destroyed. '/ 
67New York Tim!!, June 4, 1948, p. 22. 
68N!W ~ork ~1mQs, November 21, 1948, p. 10, IV. 
69New York Times, November 28, 1948, p. 8, IV. 
70New York ~1m!S, October 4, 1948, p. 61 
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In another editorial the Times showed satisfaction with clarifi-
cations equitably defining both labor and management's 
positions. 
Gradually, but surely, the rights of labor and manage-
ment, respectively, under the Taft-Hartley Act, are 
being brought into clearer definition and focus throUgh 
the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board.yL 
Although the spokesmen for organized labor seemed to be 
unanimously against the Taft-Hartley Act, there were some 
exceptions among the members. A letter signed ·Union Member" 
appeared in the Tribun!% -This law guarantees freedom for the 
individual worker. It prevents many an unnecessary strike. It 
safeguards unions and their survival. It protects the public 
welfare ..... 72 
The Democratic Party changed its opinion of the Tatt-
Hartley Act as indicated by the new party platform for the 
coming election. It seems that a section of the platform called 
for intensive study of the Taft-Hartley Act and poss1ble repeal 
of the Act. The Times was not in complete agreement with the 
newly determined position of the Democratic Party. It cautioned 
the Democrats, reminding them of the last election results. 
The 108 member resolutions committee of the Democratic 
Party has now approve4 the recommendation of a sub-
oommittee calling fir the outright repeal of the Tatt-
Hartley Labor Act.?' 
?lNew York Times, October 26, 1948, p. 30. 
720hicaso Tribune. October 2?t 1948, p. 22. 
73New York Tim,s, July 14. 194B. p. 22. 
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Another editorial was suspicious of the motives of the Democrat-
ic Party in devising this change in policy. 
This is a plain and unmasked bid for the 'labor vote' 
in the 1948 campaign; but such a maneuver is hardly 
consistent with the tact that 106 Democratic members 
of the House ot Representatives voted to override the 
President's veto of this ve£Y. legislation, whereas 
only ?6 supported the veto.'l4 
The T£ibune feared that the Democrats would disturb industrial 
peace by allowing a return to the days when the Wagner Act was 
supreme amoDg labor laws. 
The Democrats say they want to go back to the days 
when the Wagner Act governed labor relations, when 
only employers could be guilty of untair labor 
practices, and when this cO~Dtry experienced a succes-
sion of pro~racted strikes." 
The results olg~he November elections, howevert were too 
obvious to be misinterpreted. A letter to the Timel analyzed 
the meaning of the election in this way: 
After one year of it (the taft-Hartley Act), the Amer-
ican people have shouted 'enough.' Under our democra-
tic system that should mean something. Perhaps a 
coalition of Dixiecrats and old guard Republicans can 
still thwart the will ot the people. But it would not 
be healthy for America, nor those millions throughout 
the world wbo depend on the working success of democracy 
as the final hope of salvation,76 
74Ner York TimS •• July 15. 1948. p. 22. 
750hiCISO Tribuna, July 17t 1948. p. 6. 
'lGtiew York Time!i. November 16, 1948, p. 28. 
OHAPTER V 
COMMUNIST INFIDTRATION INTO UNIONS 
After the first World War, Communism created a political 
problem of national scope and concern. One of the targets of 
Communism in the United States was the labor movement. The 
situation of the CIO, which required experienced organizers and 
leaders, provided the .first major opportunity .for Communism to 
entrench itself. Taft appraised the Communist appeal to 
organized labor in this way: 
The formation of the CIO and the large demands its 
successes imposed upon the relatively few experienced 
leaders provided the Communists with an extremely 
favorable opportunity. Absence of trained staff and 
the lower level of trade union sophistication among 
the large masses ot newly organized, gave Communist 
activists a tine opportunity to gain a following in 
the ranks of organized worker, who had almost unani-
mously rejected their appeal.1 
The AFL. at that time, was composed almost completely ot 
skilled laborers who were not as easily impressed by Oommunism. 
Therefore, the problem of Oommunism could not be discussed as an 
issue applicable to the labor movement as a whole. For 
instance. in 1945 the AlL decided not to participate in the 
International Trade Union Congress in London. a Communistic 
1 Tatt, p. 625. 
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labor organization. the Tribune noted this event by writing an 
article in praise ot AFL labor pOlicies.2 
In 1946, Philip Murray, President ot the CIO. brought the 
subject of Communism betore the Executive Board. As a result. 
Murray gained authority to penalize non-compliant CIO unions. 
An investigating committee was tormed and a statement of policy 
was adopted against interference by the Communist Party or 
other political parties in the aftairs of the CIO.; These 
moves by the 010 were important in establishing organized 
laborfs;"~'opposition to Communism. Individual unions followed the 
lead ot the CIO in attempting to rid themselves of Communistic 
ties, 
In 1947 the Chamber of Commerce made public its stud,y 
entitled: "Communism Within the Labor Movement," which the 
public discovered to be of limited use 1n shedding light on the 
aotivities of Communist. in the United States. The study had 
" 
this to say: 
As ot the present, said the Chamber, the problem ot 
communism exists in scattered locals of the American 
Federation ot Labor Unions, and in a more serious way 
in international unions as well as4locals of the Con-gress ot Industrial Organizations. 
According to the New York Time!. William Green threatened 
America with the possibili~y of labor rejecting democratic 
, '. 
22g10alo Tribune, June 5. 1948, p. 16. 
'Taft, p. 625. 
4New York Timei. March 1" 1948, p_ 24. 
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ideals tor Oommunism if the Taft-Hartley was passed.5 It is 
readily apparent, however, from these cc>mmenta also appearing in 
the !1mel. about the possibilities of unification of the AFL and 
010, that he is thoroughly opposed to Communism: 
William Green. President of the AlL, said he was frankl~ 
not optimistic about achieving amalgamation soon ••• This 
pessimism. he told reporters after a session of the 
Executive Oouncil, sprang from the 'charaeter of the men 
in control of' some of those organizations.· He reterred 
specifically tg Oommunists in the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations. 
The TEibSR' intimated that Walter Reuther is in some way 
sympathetic to Oommunism in the following editorial: 
In the auto workers' international are two factions so 
closely matched in strength that each strives to out-
do the other in radicalism. 7(1n this case, radicalism 
was used to mean Oommunism.) 
The Tribune has been known to level the charge of "Oommu-
nist" or radioal whenever it felt an occasion called for the 
ultimate in vitriolic accusations, The charge was applied 
wherever the fribune found a situation which was partioularly 
objectionable, that is, when it did not meet with the Tribune's 
philosophY_ For instance, the Tr!bune felt that the "communis-
tic controlled" American Labor Party and the Democratic Party 
lacked major differenoes.8 
~ew York T!m", January 26, 1948, p. 8, IV. 
6N,w York f!les, September 12, 1948, p. 3. 
7Chica~Ofribune, January 26, 1948. p. 20. 
80hicaso Tribune. September 2, 1948. p. 8. 
Occasionally, the letters to the editor which appeared in 
the Tribune subscribed to a similar philosophy. For instance, 
this one was written by a union member who felt he was being 
forced to vote against his conscience; 
Telling the union men what to think and how to vote is 
what was done by the Communists9in Russia. Sidney Hillman follows the party line. 
The original Hartley Bill, later altered and eombined into 
the Taft-Hartley Act. contained a clause which provided for 
exclusion of tormer Communists trom union ottice. The press 
devoted quite a tew editorials to discussing this issue. The 
Timel. for instance. opposed the provision tor the reasons 
expressed in the following commentary: 
Some of the ablest opponents ot Communism in the 
whole trade movement are ex-Communists who are now 
disillusioned with that doctrine, and these men are 
in a position to fight Oommunism all the more effect-
ively for the very reason that they know its tricks. 
To deny them positions ot leadership in the labor 
movement simply because they were1sne Oommunists 1s 
as short-sighted as it is unfair. 
The tollowing letter was written in anewer to that editorial: 
In tact, your recommendations, it tollowed, would 
help the Communist cause more than anything else that 
has come out ot Washington since 1933. The Oommunists 
in labor unions are too numerous. They neither oan 
nor want to go und.rground.~ 
The section of the Taft-Hartley Act calling tor unions to 
denounce Communist affiliation by signing an affidavit to that 
9Cbicaso Tribun~t September 1, 1948, p. 26. 
lON!W York Timel. May 22, 1948, p. 26. 
llNew York Times, June 2, 1948, p. 24. 
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effect caused a great deal of tribulation in labor circles. An 
editorial in the New York Times expressed this opinion: 
! " 
We agree with this point of view. We should like to 
point out, further, that bad laws also make hard cases, 
and urge, as we have done before, that this section of 
the Labor Act Taft-Hartley be amended so es 1:;0 clear 
away any possible doubt that it has any intent of 12 
interfering with the right to free expression of opinion. 
However, a tew months later, the Times seemed to hold a differ-
ent point ot view: 
Oertainly, considering the subversive activities ot 
international Oommunism. the question of alleged 
Communist domination ot an American trade union is 
an approp»iate subject of investigation, and cer-
tainly the political affiliations of the officials 
of that union are relevant to the matter under inquiry.l} 
In an article appearing tn the ~imes. Louis Stark made this 
positive observation on labor's practical philosophy toward 
Communism: "Resentment against Communist activities in the 
labor movement is steadily increasing among the rank and tile of 
American trade unionists. u14 !he R,hic!50 Tribune, on the other 
hand, seems to have felt a number of unions were in a-position 
to be accused of Oommunist affiliations. Starting at the top of 
the list, the leadership of the CIa falls into that category. 
Neither does the rank and tile of the 010 share its 
leaders' hopes that the American economic system will 
be replaced by one drawn from Marxian blueprints •••• 
12New Y;orlt time!1t June 26, 1948, p. 16. 
13New York Tim!l. September l?, 1948. p. 24. 
14New York Time., November 16, 1948. p. 10, IV. 
any politician who accepts either the endorsement or 
the support 0fsthe CIO should be defeated for that 
reason alone. 
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In other editorials the Tribune made similar statements regard-
ing the leadership of the CIO. "In all of this tumult within 
the CIO's leadership there is not the slightest indication that 
any ot the disputants has the slightest patriotio interest in 
the United States. n16 
The Packinghouse Workers were also under severe attack by 
the TribHae. One especially caustic editorial lett no. room for 
mercy. 
Some ot the local officials ot the packinghouse workers 
are Oommunists ••• Many other leaders of the packinghouse 
workers, including most ot the international officers, 
are not Oommunists. The only plausible expl.nstion of 
their behavior is that they are plain fools.~f 
After the AFt faction settled t~eir dispute, the t£ibuns made a 
distinction between the two groups ot packingbouse workers. 
Mr. Ma~ch is district director of the striking CIO 
union in Ohicago. He is also a member of the national 
committee of the Oommunist Party ••• The AlL union ot 
packinghouse workers found DO difficulty in coming to 
terms on a new wage sca1e.18 
When the 010 strike failed, the Tribpne seemed to find justice 
in the failure. 
lSxhica60 Tribune, September 17, 1948, p. 20. 
160hicago Tribune, February 27, 1948, p. 18. 
17Chicaso Tribune, January 11, 1948. p. 20. 
lSChicaso Tribune, Mareh 20, 1948, p. 14. 
The considerable Communist bloc in the union leader-
ship, while evading responsibility tor the strike, 
took an active part in organizing the lawlessness 
which brought the union into national disrepute. l 9 
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One Tribune editorial seems to have separated its tactual 
report from its conclusions on the basis that CIO unions can not 
be completely tree trom Communist influence. The 010, having 
purged itself ot a good number ot its Oommunist bosses, still 
remains a dangerous political and economic torce in Amerlca.20 
The public indignation aroused by the press seems to have 
compelled at least one union to publicly clarity its position. 
The tollowing letter was signed by the Aoting Recording Secre-
t&r,1 ot the United Farm Equipment Workers: 
We don·t feel that we should answer for the actions 
ot any local except our own. Local 108, one of the 
largest 010 locals in the City and the largest in the 
Farm Equipment Workers Union, led the fight tor com-
pliance with the Taft-Hartley Act. ~e were the first 
to demand that our otficers sign non-Communist 
affidavits •••• 
The editors· comments: The National leadership ot 
the UHEW h&~ consistently retlected Communist 
1ntlu.nce.~J. 
19Cb1c!60 Tr~bunet May 24, 1948, p. 14. 
20Chicaso Tribune, August 22, 1948, p. 20. 
21Ch1caso Tribune, September 4, 1948, p_ 8., 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A brief review and summation of the events occurring 
during the tour years under observation should draw into a 
better perspective the obvious and permit certain analyses to 
be made using the evidence contained in the body of the thesis. 
A definite trend appears which can be divided into four 
stages. The first stage is the wartime period, during whioh 
organized labor was praised for its cooperation and contribution 
to the war effort. The press carried stories of the sacrifices 
of the working man and the public expressions of praise and 
gratitude of important government figures. The wartime stories 
were reported, however, with mixed emotions of sympathy and 
reprimand. The end of the war signaled an immediate shift in 
positions and attitudes setting the stage for the second phase. 
Organized labor felt justified in striking tor higher wages to 
balance the price increases. Management felt it had been 
limited by government restrictions long enougb and demanded the 
return of its management righ~B. The government, unprepared for 
the end of the war, antagonized everyone by refusing to 11ft 
wage and price controls. Expressions of unfriendly publio 
reactions were aimed at the striking unions who were 
68 
69 
complicating the process of production of sorely need civilian 
goods. Public indignation was most severely aroused by the 
prospect of a coal shortage. 
The calm at the end of the strike wave of 1946 was ended 
when the pressure of price increases prompted organized labor to 
demand wage increases again. The.econd wave of' strikes was 
< '., ."! .,,1-
announced half a year after the first wave ended. 
The third stage was set by this new series of wage demands 
and the ensuing work stoppages. The result of this action on 
the part of organised labor was a public demand for a reprisal 
by the government. The public saw to it that the retaliation 
would occur by electing the conservative 80th Oongress. The 
Labor-Management Relations Act was passed with much haste over 
the veto of President Truman in June ot 1947. 
Although unions were in a state ot shock and contusion 8S 
to how they should react, they did take heed and corrected 80me 
of the faults pointed out by the Tart-Hartley Act. For 
instance, the accusation of "Communist" was~;~talc:.Jl very seriously 
, 
and both houses ot organized labor commenced to purge themselves 
ot the undesirable elements. 
The initial shock of the magnitude of the negative legis-
lation contained in the Taft-Hartley Act seemed to have hurt the 
spirit of organized labor to the core. However, these feelings 
were apparently vented by the unions before the law actually 
went into operation in the early fall of 1947. Although the 
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feeling of justification was initially prevalent in management 
and government circles as expressed by the press, it soon gave 
way to a certain degree of publio regret tor the hasty and vin-
dictive measures included in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
The fourth stage was brought on by expressions of regret 
and statements by oertain sectors ot the government. like the 
Democratic Party, indicating a desire to repeal, if not the 
whole law, at least oertain objectionable seotions. The later 
part ot 1947 and allot 1948 were marked by tranquility and 
almost a complete absence of unfriendly oomments by the press. 
The growth ot union membership corresponds with these four 
stages. The tirst stage, during whioh public opinion can be 
said to have veered toward a positive attitude, had a growth 
rate ot l.5~.1 In the second stage, during which public opinion 
grew steadily more negative, unions had a growth rate of 2~. 
During the third stage, the climax ot negative feelings toward 
unions, organized labor aocumulated an 8.S. growth in member-
ship. Finally, in the docile fourth stage, unions exhibited a 
growth rate of a meager 0.5~. 
These tigures indioate a negative oorrelation between 
adverse public opinion and union growth. This finding should be 
more olosely examined. Although adverse publio opinion did not 
lThe four stages under discussion oorrespond with the 
years 1945 through 1948. The growth rates quoted are those ot 
Bernstein and are found on page 304 of his previously cited 
study,. 
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directly produce a downturn in union growth. it did result in 
restricted labor legislation. the Taft-Hartley Act. The events 
immediately preceeding t as well as following. the passage of the 
law really fall into·~ts shadow. 
The public reacted to organized labor by enacting the Taft-
Hartley Act; unions reacted to the law by significantly reducing 
their growth rate. The actions of the parties concerned fall 
into a pattern of stimuli! and consequent reactions. 
In examining the period in question, we find first that a 
fertile growth atmosphere existed immediately after the war. -
which served to enhance the chances of growth. The combination 
of the favorable attitudes of the executive and judicial 
branches of government and the post-war boom of the business 
cycle serves to create a positive atmosphere, Also, the 
structure of union organization had been nurtured and 
strengthened through the protection of wartime government 
policies; and. the union membership had the added advantage of 
being guided by aggressive leaders. 
It is crucial to understand that both management and 
organized labor felt deprived during the war. Initially. 
unions seemed to be the aggressors. since they were demanding 
the changes. while managements might have settled tor the status 
quo. As the aggressive tendencies or unions lncrease~tbe .eeds 
ot revenge and vengeanoe were planted in management, whioh. in 
turn, sowed its feelings with the government. The press, and, 
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it must be assumed, the public, grew increasingly to favor tbe 
management cause, which was borne out in the elections. A 
conservative Oongress was elected, whose ultimate goal was to 
enact severely restricting legislation. As this feeling of 
animosity grew on the part of management and the public, unions 
were necessarily placed in a defensive position. Sinoe all 
workers, not only organized workers. were feeling the pressure, 
they joined forces against the hostile opposition. As a 
result, membership rates grew substantially as long as the 
opposition continued the negative pressure. When the negative 
public opinion culminated in the passage of punitive legisla-
tion, negative expressions of opinion ceased. The goal had been 
achieved. 
Anything happening after the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
was obviously the reaction of the oonqueror and the conquered. 
respectively. The public seemed to express mixed emotions of 
satisfaction for justice aChieved and a certain amount of 
regret for revenge achieved. The f.elings ot unions were lett 
bare; they had been defeated by the severtt1 ot the measure 
advocated by the public and enacted by the ·government. Workers 
were not anxious to carry their union banners very high; 
instead, they suffered rebuke and disparagement silently and 
passively during the year, which showed a severe downturn in 
un.ion growth. 
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The climate of public opinion as expressed by the press 
had a definite influence on the events of this period. 
Indirectly", the press is largely responsible for union growth 
because of its rate in furthering the efforts of parties con-
cerned with passing the Taft-Hartley Law. The two newspapers 
differed in their editorial positions on specific issues; how-
ever. the tre~4 was undoubtedly p~management during the two 
years preceeding the Taft-Hartley Act. That is not to say that 
either the Tim!, or the T,r1b9l! were biased. They merely 
reflected and enhanced the public thought on union-management 
issues. 
Both dailies spurred the Oongress by editorializing on the 
need ot baste to pass the law. Both newspapers also round 
clauses worthy of criticism, but seemed to express the thought 
that these objectionable clauses merely needed slight editing 
or simply re-wording. In essence, both the Times and Tribuae 
were in agreement abGut the necessity and the value of the '1'aft-
Hartley Act. The Portal-to-Portal issue also obtained complete 
agreement between the two papers. Tbe Smith-Connally Act was 
one issue which mucked a steady tirade from the ~im!lt but very 
little reaction from the Tribune. 
The Oommunist issue was unique in its position with the 
newspapers. The Tribune was very staunch in its disapproval ot 
eVerything that was'; tinged by Communism. It sometimes made the 
assumption that highly objectionable (to the Tribune) situations 
?4 
were Communist inspired. The Time~. on the other hand. was not 
quite so intense in its criticisms of organized labor's pitralls 
into Communism. 
Certainly any strong statement made by a large metropolitan 
newspaper will cause concern and comment. When a newspaper 
feels it should back the public in a "cause." this form or news 
media becomes ver.ypowerful. To reiterate. the two newspapers 
were not directly responsible for reflecting the sort of public 
opinion which caused fluctuations in union growth directly. 
One can be assured. however. that the climate of public opinion 
leading to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the resultant 
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